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ARGUMENT 
Defendants/Petitioners Alan K. and Vicki W. Gurney ("Gumeys") reply as follows 
to the arguments raised by Plaintiff/Respondent Iron Head Construction, Inc. ("Iron 
Head") in its brief on appeal: 
I. ENTITLEMENT TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS A QUESTION OF 
LAW. 
Iron Head argues the trial court's prejudgment interest decision presents a mixed 
question of fact and law and must be affirmed because the Gumeys failed to marshal the 
evidence on appeal. This argument is meritless for two reasons. 
First, Iron Head raised this issue before the Court of Appeals, which rejected it by 
holding that "'a trial court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment interests presents a 
question of law.'" Iron Head Constr., Inc. v. Gurney, 2008 UT App l,^ f 5, 176 P.3d 453 
(citation omitted). Iron Head did not file a cross-petition for certiorari on this issue. 
Thus, it is waived. See Utah R. App. P. 45, 47(a), 48(d); Colosimo v. Roman Catholic 
Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2007 UT 25, If 11, 156 P.3d 806 ("On certiorari review, [the 
Supreme Court] reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, not the decision of the 
district court."). 
Second, even if this Court were to consider Iron Head's argument, the Gumeys 
have no marshaling burden. The duty to marshal is imposed only where an appellant 
challenges a fact finding. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 1,\ 17 
n. 4, 994 P.2d 193 ("[T]he marshaling requirement applies only to challenges of factual 
findings, not to conclusions of law."). 
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It is well established that "[a] trial court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment 
interest presents a question of law which [is] review[ed] for correctness." Smith v. 
Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, \ 16, 82 P.3d 1064. While Iron Head argues the 
Gurneys have a marshaling burden because the determination of whether to award 
prejudgment interest is a mixed question of law and fact, citing Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 
264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) and Carlson Distributing Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., LLC, 
2004 UT App 227, 95 P.3d 1171, neither case supports this assertion. Davies does not set 
forth a standard of review and Carlson confirms that the decision to grant or deny 
prejudgment interest is a question of law. See Carlson, 2004 UT App 227 at ^ 15. 
Iron Head has no legal entitlement to any prejudgment interest—regardless of the 
amount—because the award was based upon a compromise sum, arrived at through the 
litigants' agreement to settle all claims between them, including equitable claims, prior to 
and in lieu of pursuing a judgment on (or dismissal of) the underlying causes of action. 
This is not a fact-sensitive issue, but a legal one having equal application regardless of 
the facts at issue in that case. Thus, there is no duty to marshal. 
II. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT AN AWARD OF 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
Even assuming arguendo that the Gurneys were required to marshal evidence, 
which they were not, they have amply fulfilled their burden. Specifically, the Gurneys 
set forth, in Fact paragraphs 10 through 18 of their initial brief, everything the trial court 
and Court of Appeals relied on in awarding prejudgment interest to Iron Head. The 
Gurneys further cited to the pleadings filed by Iron Head. 
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Iron Head argues that the Gurneys did not marshal the evidence because they did 
not cite all of the evidence adduced at trial and did not order a transcript of the trial.1 Iron 
Head's argument itself reveals an inherent flaw in Iron Head's position that it is entitled 
to prejudgment interest: The trial was never completed and, as indicated in the April 14, 
2004 Order of the trial court, the dispute was settled while Iron Head's first witness was 
still testifying, "without completing Iron Head's case and without the presentation of any 
evidence by the Gurneys." (R. 392-93; Appendix B to the Gurneys' Opening Brief) No 
findings of fact were made. The Court of Appeals agreed "the Gurneys are correct that 
the trial court is not authorized to make fact findings without a trial," but, curiously, 
stated that the court needed to make a finding of the date payment was due in order to 
award prejudgment interest. Iron Head, 2008 UT App 1 at J^ 21. 
Iron Head's rationale misses the mark. Prejudgment interest requires, inter alia, 
that "damages" be measurable by "fixed rules of evidence." Smith, 2003 UT 41 at U 17. 
Not only were no damages awarded, prejudgment interest could not properly be based on 
the incomplete evidence presented at the trial; this partial evidence was internally 
inconsistent and would have been further contradicted by the Gurneys if the trial had 
The Gurneys cited an Affidavit of Patrick Kilbourne (R. 362-377) to describe the 
conflicting and inconsistent evidence submitted by Iron Head and demonstrating that it 
would be impossible to determine the actual amount of money owed to Iron Head (if any) 
without completing the trial. (Gurneys' Opening Brief, pp. 7-9, fn. 4). Although Iron 
Head now objects to the use of this affidavit, it raised no objection in the trial court and 
the Kilbourne Affidavit is part of the appellate record. Iron Head may not challenge the 
sufficiency of this affidavit for the first time on appeal. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("It is a well-established rule that a [litigant] who fails to bring an 
issue before the trial court is generally barred from raising it for the first time on 
appeal."). 
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been completed. A trial transcript would add nothing. The rules of evidence ensure the 
fair and orderly presentation of evidence by each party. To rely on incomplete evidence 
or to make findings on partial evidence would be clearly erroneous, fundamentally unfair 
and incorrect as a matter of law. 
III. THE PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AWARD WAS NOT BASED ON 
FACTS AND FIGURES, 
Iron Head argues the $43,500 settlement amount represents mathematically certain 
"damages" comprised of stipulated costs, materials, labor and interest minus lost profits. 
(Iron Head's Br., pp.14-15, 17-18 and fn. 2.) As support, Iron Head cites to the trial 
clerk's minutes from the aborted trial referencing (a) evidence, including invoices, 
offered by Iron Head and admitted at trial and (b) the reduction of the settlement amount 
from $45,000 to $43,500 when Iron Head was unable to substantiate yet another claimed 
expense. 
Iron Head distorts the meaning of the minutes: There was no agreement that the 
$43,500 settlement figure equaled all of Iron Head's costs and interest minus lost profits. 
The Gurneys did not agree that any amount was owed to Iron Head, and Iron Head has 
identified no such stipulation. The Gurneys agreed to pay the negotiated $43,500 as a 
nuisance amount to end the lawsuit and to avoid a lengthy continuance. Indeed, in doing 
so the Gurneys gave up their claim that all of Iron Head's alleged expenses were included 
in the sum set forth in the written contract prepared and signed by Iron Head. 
Iron Head's own pleadings defeat its "costs and interest minus lost profit" 
argument. In its complaint, Iron Head sought $71,000 plus profit and interest. It 
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previously filed a mechanic's lien on the property claiming the sum of $119,051. 
(R. 1-8.) Each invoice yielded a different total yet, and all of these figures are at variance 
with Iron Head's written contract. (R. 15-16.) According to Iron Head itself, the $43,500 
settlement amount did not equal Iron Head's damages minus lost profits. 
Moreover, the statements of fact in Iron Head's brief do not support its assertion. 
In paragraph 12, Iron Head claims that it was required to borrow $61,800 to pay its 
subcontractors and for the costs of materials.2 (Iron Head's Brief, p. 8.) In paragraph 13, 
Iron Head claims it had incurred interest on the loan of $13,048.32 as of the second day 
of trial. (Id.) However, the trial court made no finding connecting its award of 
prejudgment interest to the alleged bank debt or any other specified amount or factor.3 
Indeed, if, as Iron Head claims, the interest on the bank debt were part of its actual 
damages that were the basis for the settlement, then Iron Head incurred only around 
$30,000 ($43,500 minus $13,048.32) in construction costs—a different amount yet again 
than it has previously claimed. 
Finally, that the parties reduced the settlement amount from $45,000 to $43,500 
because Iron Head could not substantiate a claimed payment does not establish the 
settlement amount was based on measurable facts and figures. Iron Head's failure may 
The Gurneys note that this and other record cites set forth in Iron Head's 
Statement of Facts are not to the record evidence, but rather to Iron Head's own 
characterizations of that evidence in Iron Head's Brief in Support of Claim for 
Prejudgment Interest, filed with the trial court on December 5, 2003. (R. 323-36.) 
The Gurneys demonstrated they were ahead on their payments at the time that Iron 
Head borrowed money, and that the loan was not required as a result of this project. 
(R. 372-74.) 
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have been a factor in the parties' agreement to settle the case for $43,500 instead of 
$45,000, but it does not establish how the remainder of the settlement amount was 
calculated. Iron Head's failure does not change the fact that the $43,500 settlement 
figure was a product of the parties' discretion, arrived at for the first time on November 
13, 2003. As Judge Orme observed in dissent, from the record evidence, one "cannot tell 
how much of the settlement amount, if any, is for the kind of thing that may warrant an 
award of prejudgment interest and how much reflects the range of imponderables 
inherent in any settlement decision." Id. at |^ 26. For the Gurneys, at least, the settlement 
arose from the costs and imponderables of having to resume the trial months later. 
IV. THE PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AWARD WAS NOT LIQUIDATED 
PRIOR TO THE DATE OF SETTLEMENT. 
Iron Head tries to support the award of prejudgment interest from December 31, 
2000 by claiming a meeting occurred in early December 2000 where Richard Curtis (of 
Iron Head) allegedly carried (but did not present) an invoice to Alan Gurney, who refused 
to pay it. Iron Head claims it knew it would not be paid and was thus damaged as the 
date of this meeting. Once again, both the trial court's and Court of Appeals' reliance on 
this meeting is incorrect as a matter of law because there has never been a factual finding 
of what occurred at this meeting. Nor could there be, as only partial evidence had been 
adduced. Even then, an early December 2000 meeting would not justify an award of 
prejudgment interest from December 31, 2000. Finally, the partial trial evidence 
indicates that the invoice Richard Curtis claims to have taken to the December 2000 
meeting was for $82,463.33, not $43,500, refuting Iron Head's argument that it was owed 
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$43,500 as of the date of the meeting. (R. 298, 333-34, 350-51, 384; see also Gurneys' 
Opening Brief, Fact 7.) Indeed, it was not. The $43,500 figure did not exist before the 
November 13, 2003 date on which it was negotiated. 
V, THE AMOUNT OF LOSS MUST BE FIXED AS OF A PARTICULAR 
TIME. 
Iron Head inaccurately argues that prejudgment interest does not require the 
"amount of damages to be liquidated as of the date such damages are ascertained." (Iron 
Head's Brief, p. 19.) To the contrary, prejudgment interest can only be awarded if, inter 
alia, "the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time." Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT 
App 19/| 43, 155 P.3d 917. Although a dispute as to the amount of damages will not 
necessarily preclude imposition of prejudgment interest, see id. at f 45, there must still be 
a determination of a mathematically quantifiable and calculable loss as of a particular 
date prior to the entry of judgment. 
Here, the $43,500 is neither mathematically quantifiable nor calculable from any 
evidence. There was no determination that Iron Head suffered any loss caused by the 
Gurneys. There is no evidence to suggest that the sum of $43,500 was owed to Iron Head 
prior to November 13, 2003. And there was no judgment. Prejudgment interest was, 
therefore, improper as a matter of law. 
VL PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS IMPROPER ON EQUITABLE CLAIMS. 
The cases cited in the Gurneys' opening brief establish that prejudgment interest 
should not have been awarded to Iron Head on the additional ground that the settlement 
resolved all of Iron Head's legal and equitable claims, without distinction. See e.g., 
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Shoreline Dev., Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207, 212 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Dejavue, 
Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 355, 993 P.2d 222. Iron Head responds to these 
authorities by arguing that, since the Court of Appeals issued Dejavue and Shoreline, this 
Court should defer to the Court of Appeals' decision in Iron Head because the Court of 
Appeals is in the best position to interpret them. This rationale is faulty. The Court of 
Appeals is not in a better position to interpret Utah law on prejudgment interest than the 
Supreme Court. Moreover, this Court has independently determined that prejudgment 
interest is inappropriate on equitable claims. See, e.g., Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 
1097 (Utah 1991). 
VII. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS NOT JUSTIFIED AS CONSEQUENTIAL 
DAMAGES. 
Finally, Iron Head tries to save the prejudgment interest award by arguing that it 
amounts to consequential damages for its unjust enrichment claim. This argument is 
fundamentally incorrect. Iron Head gave up any right to pursue a judgment for damages, 
compensatory or consequential, by settling the case. In making its argument, Iron Head 
ignores the fact that the trial court made no findings that would support an award of 
consequential damages, nor did the court enter such an award. Furthermore, Iron Head 
sought recovery primarily on its equitable claim for unjust enrichment, for which 
prejudgment interest is not allowed. See Dejavue, 1999 UT App 355 at \ 24. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, together with those listed in the Opening Brief, the 
Court of Appeals' decision must be reversed and the trial court's award of prejudgment 
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interest to Iron Head vacated. The Gurneys further request an award of their costs 
incurred herein in accordance with Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Dated this 25th day of August 2008. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
EDWIN C. BARNE 
AARON D. LEBENTA 
LLOYD D. RICKENBACH 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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